In mission critical systems the operational success of the system depends on many aspects of the system's operation such as availability, security, performance and safety. According to the design of the system, dependability attributes can be in conflict or in harmony often resulting in unavoidable trade-offs. Adopting a more flexible approach towards dependability allows us to achieve tolerable limits for each dependability attribute, whilst maintaining acceptable overall dependability levels for the system. Elicitation of the requirements that define the levels of the dependability attributes can only be meaningfully done in the context of the system's operation. In this paper we present how we can extend existing safety techniques to elicit dependability requirements. Well established deviation analysis techniques in the safety domain are already used to perform safety analysis. However the safety techniques cannot be used efficiently to explicitly elicit requirements for other attributes. This is primarily because the prompts as well as the models on which the prompts are applied are optimised for safety. The method presented uses a set of prompts optimised to examine the system for dependability attribute concerns, which are applied on models, taken from the MOD architectural framework, that are suitable for analysing each of the dependability attributes.
Introduction
Whilst there is no overall consensus on the exact definition of dependability, many agree that it can be described as the "system's characteristic that justifies placing one's reliance on it", entailing such attributes as reliability, safety, security and availability [13] . Eliciting dependability requirements is an important part of the system's lifecycle. Dependability requirements should address all possible dependability concerns identifying at the same time their importance and impact on the operation of the system. Dependability attributes can be interrelated sometimes in harmony, whereas others in conflict resulting in inevitable trade-offs. During requirements elicitation, in order for the stakeholders to justify any acceptable trade-offs that may be made, they need to understand the rationale based on which the target requirement was set. In safety the requirements for a system are typically elicited through following a structured safety assessment process during each stage of the lifecycle [23] .
As the system evolves and design decisions are made about the system, the designers need to examine how their initial requirements and concerns can be related to the more detailed layers of the system design. In the safety domain deviation analysis techniques and methods such as the Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOPS) [16] are used during the safety analysis of the system, to identify possible deviations from intended behaviour and their effect on the overall safety levels of the system by assessing the risk of each deviation. Even though other attributes are recognised during the analysis such as performance, the single focus is on safety. This results to a tendency to overlook the non safety effects, without thoroughly examining the impact of the deviations on the overall behaviour of the system. For example during the operability assessment in a HAZOP study, it may be recognised that effects of a deviation may result in system behaviour that is not acceptable by the system stakeholders. Identifying how the dependability attributes may be interrelated requires examination of the more detailed system models from the viewpoint of each dependability attribute that we are interested in.
Existing Practice in Deviation Analysis for Safety
Deviation analyses consist of a set of methods and techniques that can be systematically applied on the design in order to achieve a better insight about possible safety implications. The analysis methods aim to identify the effects of a failure conditions, accordingly classifying the severity and probability of each failure condition, and guiding the analysts to identify possible causes. This is achieved by analysing the design with respect to possible deviations from the intended behaviour that may occur. In the early stages of the system's lifecycle, the causes as well as the effects are unknown. At this stage analysts extrapolate possible effects based on the preliminary studies of the design and early identification of hazards. As the analysis methods are applied on the gradually evolving design, the confidence about the causes and effects increases. Ideally, at the end of the system's lifecycle both the causes and the effects of a deviation in the intended system operation should be known. Pumfrey [22] classifies causes and effects as unknown, projected and known and describes the different lifecycle activities and safety methods in those terms.
The civil aerospace guidance document ARP 4761 provides a comprehensive guide of safety assessment analysis for airborne systems [23] . ARP 4761 suggests the following activities during a system's lifecycle: Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), Preliminary System Safety Analysis (PSSA) and System Safety Analysis (SSA). Figure 1 presents a schematic of how the safety analysis stages are associated with the system lifecycle. Figure 1 : Safety analyses during system lifecycle [22] FHA considers the aircraft functions and identifies failure conditions related to them. The participants during FHA are required to evaluate the consequences of each failure condition and assign probability target according to the severity of each failure condition. Taking into account the contribution of the aircraft systems to the overall aircraft functions, analysts specify safety objectives for the constituent systems of each function. [26] . However the stakeholders involved can be more flexible with the failure conditions considered which can be the result of brainstorming, or previous experience.
Pumfrey extended HAZOP for safety analysis of software, specifying the Software Hazard Analysis and Resolution in Design (SHARD) method [22] . A prominent characteristic of SHARD is that it uses a simplified set of guidewords, which are applied to the concept of service. A service is defined as the "communication of a piece of information, with a specific value, at a particular time" [22] .
Analysts tend to apply deviation analyses under the perception that safety is of paramount importance tending to overlook non safety related effects. For example in table 1 the effect of annunciated loss of deceleration during taxi was considered as not having a safety effect. Although this may be true, other implications apart from the ones related to safety are not considered. For example it is easily conceived that such a failure may have an adverse effect on the operation of the airport. Kletz also identifies the tendency to overlook operability effects of deviations in HAZOPS and emphasises on the fact that HAZOPS is a very potent method for understanding operability implications [12] .
Extending Analyses to Address Dependability
Whilst there is no overall consensus on the exact definition of dependability, it is generally perceived as an umbrella term covering attributes such as reliability, availability, safety and security [9] . Prasad states that dependability attributes can be interrelated and they are not orthogonal to each other; hence they can be in conflict or in harmony. Additionally Prasad adopts the view that dependability is a composite property made up of a number of different attributes. Furthermore she highlights the fact that the attributes correspond to stakeholders' subjective desiderata [21] . Each of the stakeholders (or groups of stakeholders), according to their concerns, have a unique perspective regarding the desired operational behaviour of the system. Dependability has been associated with faults that can result in failures [5] , [14] , and [25] . With respect to the system's overall behaviour, failures can be interpreted according to the viewpoint of the attribute of interest. For example the implications of a compromise of reliability may include compromise of safety, availability or performance. This is also suggested in clauses of the MoD Defence Standard 00-56, which stresses that: "safety cannot be considered in isolation from other system attributes such as performance and availability" [15] .
A failure that occurs during the operation of the system may impact on the behaviour of a dependability attribute, which in its turn may have an impact on other attributes or result in unacceptable system operation. Extending deviation analysis techniques to address dependability requires investigating the system from the standpoint of each attribute. Figure 2 shows an extension of the bow-tie analysis diagram used in safety, to illustrate the concept of extending the deviation analysis to engulf dependability attributes. In traditional safety bow-tie analysis a failure condition is evaluated identifying the causes or contributing factors and the effects and escalating factors. The failure conditions are derived from a list of hazards (e.g. FHA) or can be a specific set of guidewords (e.g. HAZOP).
Extending the concept to address dependability needs to specify what guidewords are going to be used and which models should be prompted. As with the examples of HAZOP and SHARD, application of a guideword on a different element of the model can reveal different concerns.
The projected effects of a deviation should not only be restricted to one dimension just by focusing only one attribute. Instead, wider consequences should be assessed understanding how a deviation from the viewpoint of an attribute can affect the operation of the system. The same principle should be applied during identification of causes. For example, depending on the context of operation, a security failure condition such as 'denial of service' (security) may reveal as causes, failures regarding other attributes such as 'limited processing rate of requests' (performance).
Reasoning about the overall behaviour of a system necessitates considering the failure conditions with respect to the attributes of interest to the stakeholders and the impact on the overall operation of the system. This requires understanding of how each of the attributes of interest can have an effect on another, as well as their contribution to the system's operational behaviour that is required by the system stakeholder.
Definition of attribute concerns
Each of the dependability attributes represents a unique viewpoint regarding the operation of the system. For these reasons each attribute is represented by a different class of concerns. For example a concern for security may be unauthorised access, for performance inadequate rate and for safety injury or physical damage. Dependability deviation analysis should be able to reveal all these concerns. There is no universal definition of concerns. Instead the stakeholders of a system decide what is important to them regarding the operation of the system. Stakeholders may be influenced as to what they are concerned with, according to the domain in which the system is deployed. This is apparent in the descriptions of some defence standards which identify concerns that have been inherited from accumulated past experience.
We [1] . By defining the attribute scenarios the users identify how the architecture should react when a specific stimulus occurs. Based on a collection of specific scenarios Bass et al. specified the general scenarios to cover the stimuli that have been recorded during application of the quality attributes in a number of projects. In order to achieve the required attribute goals (e.g. security) quality scenarios identify a set of common concerns that need to be taken into account when reasoning about that particular attribute.
Although SEI general scenarios were used as the main source for concerns, they were in some cases complemented by recommended practices and standards. Standards often provide guidelines about what needs to be addressed in a system, echoing experiences and concerns accumulated over a period of years by a relatively large sample of practitioners. For example the MoD Defence Standard 00-40 provides guidelines on assurance regarding the reliability and availability of a system, the Defence Standard 00-25 addresses human factors [17] , and the Common Criteria security [2] . Table 2 presents the concerns that have been identified for five dependability attributes.
Finding the Right Models
One of the challenges applying the deviation guidewords for dependability analysis is the use of the appropriate system models. Instantiation of the deviations should be done using suitable models in order to achieve a meaningful analysis. For example data flow diagrams are more suitable to reveal timing concerns whereas human factor concerns can be revealed more easily in use cases. Each of the attribute concerns focuses on particular aspects of the system. For example in order to probe the system using the unavailability of a function concern the analysts should examine the models that represent the system functions. Table 2 : Dependability concerns derived primarily from SEI quality scenarios There are many modelling languages and frameworks which could be examined. As part of the deviation analysis process we aimed in providing a generic paradigm which could be further extended and customised. In order to do this we focused on describing generic characteristics of suitable models that can reveal more efficiently a concern during the analysis. Table 3 presents the characteristics of the models most appropriate for each concern.
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UML is a very popular modelling language and often is the reference of comparison with other modelling languages. We evaluated which of the main UML diagrams are suitable for modelling each concern. Although justification of selection of models can be made ad-hoc we followed a more systematic examination of the models by referring to UML infrastructure [20] . The UML infrastructure provides the specification for each UML model identifying in detail what information about the model is contained each models.
Extensibility of Guidewords
In FHA the guidewords are usually the result of a process to identify possible hazards with regard to attribute of interest. In the example of ARP 4761 previously presented, the attribute of interest is safety. On the same tack, we can prompt the system with wider dependability concerns.
In HAZOP, the guidewords were defined in the context of the chemical industry domain. The resultant set was broad enough and generic enough to be applied in a number of domains and it is being applied confidently by the safety community. However limiting the probing of a model to this set of guidewords may cause problems during the analysis. Being generic, the guidewords require scoping, imagination and extensive experience on interpreting the deviations. Srivatanakul in [24] uses HAZOP in order to perform a security analysis of a design. Again, the need for appropriate interpretation is highlighted. SHARD is an example in which the guidewords were altered to be compatible with software failure models ( Table 4 shows the original HAZOP and SHARD guidewords). Additionally, Kletz underlines that batch plants (as opposed to continuous flow plants) require a different set of deviations [12] . It is worth noticing that even with the existing set of guidewords, probing a model represents implicit references to attributes. For example the omission (or NO) guideword represents an availability concern, whereas early and late reflect performance concerns. Value and commission can be thought of as reliability failure conditions. Although the guidewords can be linked to attribute concerns, they were defined based on experience and according to the common failures that were recorded. Explicitly considering each attribute of interest provided us with guidewords more suitable, 'optimised' to reveal the effects of the concerns, making clearer to establish a link between the deviation and the attribute of interest and its related concerns. Extending the set of recommended guidewords is essential in order for the analysts to be able to identify the deviation and reveal any plausible causes and evaluate the effect. Starting with the required elements that are suitable for modelling the failure condition we reverse engineered the respective deviations by examining whether the existing set of guidewords used in HAZOP and SHARD can satisfactorily reveal them. 
HAZOP
Example -A System of Systems Scenario
The concept of Systems of Systems (SoS) was introduced as a term for complex systems, components of which were developed independently. In general terms SoS can be described as "an organised complex unity assembled from distributed autonomous systems, capable of independent provision of services, collaborating to achieve an overall system purpose" [6] .
One of the most prevalent examples of SoS is the concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) [8] . The NCW concept suggests cooperation between all involved military units in order to achieve its mission goals. The UK equivalent of NCW is called the Network Enabled Capability (NEC). In the remainder of the paper we illustrate the application of the methodologies presented, using the Anti-Guerrilla Operations (AGO) scenario; an example based on the concepts of NCW and NEC. Working predominantly with a scenario based approach, the term AGO scenario (or AGO) is used in the rest of the paper to refer to the specific instance and configuration of the SoS elements for the particular scenario.
In the scenario, enemy guerrilla activity is identified by unmanned aerial vehicles patrolling the hostile area. Artillery is used to weaken the identified enemy defences, allowing transport and attack helicopters to transport and support Special Forces neutralising the enemy. Modelling of the AGO has been prepared in accordance to the Ministry of Defence Architectural Framework (MODAF), described in the next section.
Defence Architecture Frameworks (DAF)
The US Department of Defence initially specified DODAF in order to "define a common approach for DoD architecture description development, presentation, and integration for both war fighting operations and business operations and processes" [17] . The framework consists of a number of products (or models) organised in views, which ultimately describe the complete operation of the system. The products describe various aspects of the system and essentially constitute the models of the system. DODAF products are organised in four views; "operational", "systems", "technical", and the "all-views" view which is used as reference to maintain consistency between the views and the products. MODAF is the equivalent framework defined by the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD). The MoD tailored MODAF to its particular needs adding two more views; the "strategic" and "acquisition" views. MODAF and DODAF models are very similar and the views that are common share the same set of products.
For the purposes of the paper we have considered only the operational and systems view, as these are the only views that represent system design. Each of the DAF products entails a separate viewpoint regarding the operation of the system such as the activities of the overall system and the connectivity between the elements of the system. The MoD and DoD specification do not provide a definite way for developing the products. However, the DoD deskbook provides guidelines for a data-centric approach, called the activity Based Methodology (ABM) [17] . Figure 4 presents the sequence in which the products are constructed following the ABM. ABM is used to maintain consistency between the DAF products, creating integrated architectures by adding detail to existing models, the elements of which can be mapped onto the new models. An important aspect of the ABM methodology is that during the evolution of the system, the developers follow a set of well specified steps incorporating traceability during development of the models. The addition of detail in each step, results to the evolution of the overall system by defining new models.
DAF models using the ABM, define a hierarchy that can be used to trace dependability considerations from the high level 
Identification of Initial Concerns for AGO
Comparing this stage with the evolution lifecycle of system development this corresponds to the initial highest level activities, which includes elicitation and refinement of requirements and conception of system design. At this stage system analysis is dependent to a large degree on the analysts' experience, domain knowledge and intuition. Subjectivity of the stakeholders' requirements at this stage requires capture of the rationale and justification of the stated requirements and initial identification of hazards. It is essential that the acknowledged attributes of interest are related to the concept of operations.
Hence, reasoning regarding possible compromise of an attribute can be evaluated in the context of the system's operation. Part of this phase of the analysis is the definition of the concerns for each attribute of interest. As already discussed these can be derived from failure models, expertise, or past experience that the involved stakeholders may have.
At this stage of the system specification the interest lies in identifying what attributes can affect the operation of the system and how. Initially the stakeholders need to identify what is the projected benefit from asking for the system to demonstrate the qualities of a particular attribute. This is followed by identification of concerns for each attribute and analysis of the possible impact of the concerns on the system's concept of operation. Interpretation of the failure conditions for each attribute is essential to take place in context to the system's operation. By the end of the process the stakeholders will have identified what each stakeholder requires when specifying the overall attributes and how failure of achieving it impacts on the operation of the system ( Table 6 ). Furthermore this step allows the stakeholders to think systematically about the system operation so that deviations from intended behaviour can be applied later on during analysis.
Initial identification of dependability concerns enables the analysts to associate further analysis with the operational context. When more detailed models of the system are probed, decision on classification of effect and acceptability or not of the risk is justified based on the traceability of the effects to the operation of the system.
Attribute
Overall Utility Concern Interpretation Consequence CONOPS Availability
The AGO capability should be available when requested. Unavailability Enemy forces can not be neutralised. Possible damages due to guerrilla activity.
Performance
Ability to perform the scenario within a time span and to a certain level of effectiveness Latency Enemy forces escape friendly forces. Deadline miss n/a Throughput Systems cannot suppress enemy adequately endangering the friendly units sent. Inadequate amount of friendly forces sent, which may be overpowered.
Reliability
Ability to provide the functionality required correctly Physical failure System may be less effective and failure of a system may cause damages to the user
Incorrect value
Enemy forces escape friendly forces users of the system may be endangered.
Data integrity
Incorrect state
Systems cannot synchronise allowing enemy forces the ability to act. Security
Unauthorised access
Enemy may sabotage and mislead friendly units. Strategic information may be disclosed.
Assumed identity
Can lead to friendly fire or delay to engage endangering friendly units Human Factors
Fatigue
Impact on the health of users. Users also more prone to make mistakes endangering friendly units. 
Analysis of the Node Connectivity Diagram
Having identified the top level concerns, analysts are able to examine any system model for deviations. In this example we analyse the AGO using the MODAF OV-2 model (chosen randomly for the illustration of the example), which consists of Figure 5 and Table 7 . In this case we chose UML as the language in which to implement the MODAF model. Based on the well defined steps for HAZOP [16] and SHARD, we apply the extended set of guidewords to the needline element of the OV-2 model ( Table 8 ). The MODAF describes needline as "A relationship specifying the need to exchange information between nodes. The needline does not indicate how the transfer is implemented" [18] . The results are documented slightly different than in traditional HAZOP. After the prompt we only analyse the effects (columns Local Effects and effects on Concept of Operation). Classification of the effects and specification of targets for the attribute (specification of target probabilities in the ARP 4761 example) are discussed in the next section, explaining how we can think about the effects in order to specify flexible requirements.
It is necessary that the involved stakeholders consider both the local effects and the effects on the concept of operations. In order to analyse the local effects, analysts focus on the model in question, performing a thorough evaluation of the immediate impact of the deviation. In this case impact on information exchanges. Having examined the effects of the deviation on the model that is being under analysis, the stakeholders need to understand the contribution of the element that was prompted (i.e. needline) to the overall operation of the system. Achieving this requires understanding of the viewpoint of the DAF model (i.e. communications) under which the element was prompted, and its association with the operation of the system.
Needline ID Information Exchange
Producer Consumer For example although we can understand in this case what the effects are with respect to the needlines, we need to identify how this needlines are used in operation in order to be able to make a meaningful assessment on the overall operation. Kelly et al. [11] suggest that good traceability can be a challenge when performing FHA, as the results of the FHA cannot be traced to the individual systems participating Albeit this can be done intuitively, we followed a more systematic approach, by identifying the commonalities of the model with other MODAF models. This was done by examining the MODAF meta-model. The meta-model provides a specification of what each model presents. By examining the common elements (i.e. meta-model classes) between the MODAF products we can identify 'logical interfaces'. For example an information exchange is also used in activities in a MODAF activity diagram (OV-5). Figure 5 shows the links of the OV-2 model (that is being analysed) with the other MODAF models. Enhancing the traceability of the models enables the analysts to gain a better understanding about the how the deviation that was considered will affect the overall operation of the AGO, also developing the last column that is presented in the analysis of the OV-2 (Table 8) .
Eliciting Requirements and Establishing Dependability Case
The purpose of a dependability case is to communicate an argument that a system is acceptably dependable in a given operational context [4] . Dependability cases are an extension of the concept of safety cases. Although the argument of a case can be presented in a textual form, experience has shown that this is inefficient, often resulting in weak arguments that are hard to comprehend. Because of these problems the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) was developed (over ten years ago) to structure and present clear and comprehensible cases [10] . Evolving in parallel to the system, goals are decomposed until they can be directly supported by evidence collected during the development and testing phases of the system. GSN goals are specific claims that a system has achieved a particular requirement. Being able to explicitly represent and associate all the elements of an argument, GSN helps to articulate post-conditions for the initially identified requirements of the system in question. Deviation analyses provide input to the process of dependability case evolution.
When developing dependability case the dependability requirements are described as goals, the achievement of which will be supported by concrete evidence at the end of the system's lifecycle. In essence, when we examine how deviations can (negatively) affect the system's operation, we identify the corresponding (positive) claims that we will need to make in order to construct a compelling argument about the dependability of the system. Engineering practice has shown that it is impossible to achieve all dependability requirements without compromise. Previous work on the area of dependability cases [5] proposed that adopting a more flexible approach when specifying requirements is more realistic and pragmatic approach, which lays the foundation for the resolution of any conflicts that may appear. According to this work a dependability goal is expressed in the context of two values capturing the target and the limit values of the goal. The two values constitute the region in which although the system is below the target value, this can be tolerated in order to gain some other benefit, resulting on overall acceptable system. Having identified the effect of the deviation we need to examine how the deviation contributes to the overall acceptability levels of the goals. The following steps provide a guide that assists thinking about flexibility in requirements.
The steps should complement the deviation analysis and should be documented either in Table 8 or in relation to conclusions drawn when constructing Table 8 (i.e. deviation).
1. Evaluate classification of the deviation risk based on both local and CONOPS effects (e.g. acceptable, intolerable).
Examine grounds for nomination of risk classification
3. Given the deviation from intended behaviour and grounds consider how fluctuation can reduce/raise risk classification.
Examining the rationale (grounds) behind an assessment and classification of a deviation, it may be possible for stakeholders to accept a more flexible approach towards requirements, gaining in the same time confidence that their interests (and motives for specifying requirements) have been shared and understood. Traceability between the model that is being analysed and the rest of the models that describe the system behaviour is essential to achieve this. MODAF provides us with an understandable platform for traceability showing how each model can be ultimately related to the concept of operations of the system (Figures 6 and 5 ).
Summary
Deviation analyses have been extensively used in the safety domain for understanding the system's modes of failure and drive the safety lifecycle of the system. Literature and practice throughout a wide range of applications in industry OV-2 OV-3 OV-5
OV-6 SV-5 SV-1
suggest that deviation analysis can be a very potent approach for considering a wider range of failure modes involving other dependability attributes. The paper considered an approach for extending deviation analyses for dependability addressing challenges such as the extension of the used guidewords and selection of appropriate models. Application of dependability deviation analysis can be a very effective technique not only revealing failure conditions but also their effect on the greater operation of the system as envisaged by its stakeholders. Finally further examining the acceptability of effects during deviation analysis can result in adopting a more flexible approach towards eliciting requirements.
